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FINANCING OHIO SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 19922002: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
Nancy Marion,∗1 Rick Farmer*2 and Todd Moore*3

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2000 Ohio Supreme Court election renewed interest in judicial
selection reform.1 The election was noted for interest group issue
advocacy and undisclosed campaign spending.2 Advocacy groups spent
millions attempting to unseat incumbent Justice Alice Robie Resnick,
leaving the impression that Ohio justice is controlled by special interests
∗1
Nancy Marion is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron. Her research
interests revolve around the interplay of politics and criminal justice. She is the author of six books
and numerous articles in that area.
*2
Rick Farmer is Director of Committee Staff at the Oklahoma House of Representatives.
Formerly, he was Associate Professor of Political Science and a fellow in the Ray C. Bliss Institute
of Applied Politics at the University of Akron. Rick is the author of numerous articles on
campaigns and elections.
*3
Todd Moore holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from Miami University, Oxford, Ohio,
and a Master’s of Applied Politics from the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of
Akron. His research interests include campaign finance, interest groups and elections. Todd
previously worked in issue and candidate campaigns and is currently pursuing a doctorate in
Political Science.
1. Ohio’s history concerning judicial selection reform is lengthy. Numerous attempts have
been made to change Ohio’s semi-partisan method; the most common approach has been merit
selection. The Ohio League of Women Voters challenged an early attempt to reform the method in
1938. Further attempts between 1953 and 1979 argued for merit selection method reform. See
Richard J. Reubel, Note, Judicial Selection and Tenure—The Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 255, 263 (1973); KATHLEEN BARBER, Selection of Ohio Appellate Judges: A Case Study in
Invisible Politics, in POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ISSUES IN OHIO 222-26 (John J. Gargan &
James G. Coke eds., Kent State Univ. Press 1972); CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE,
CHOOSING JUSTICE (Washington State Univ. Press 1997). Merit selection reemerged in 1997 as a
ballot initiative sponsored by the Ohio League of Women Voters and the Ohio State Bar
Association; Issue 3, the ballot initiative was defeated by a 2:1 margin. See JOHN FELICE, JOHN
KILWEIN, & ELIOT SLOTNICK, Judicial Reform in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 55, 65
(Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., Univ. Press of America 1993).
2. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2002, 15, 33 (Bert Brandenberg, ed., Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Stake
Campaign) (Mar. 2004).
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and trial lawyers.3 The uses of negative campaigning and issue
advocacy seemed to confirm suspicions that the Ohio Supreme Court
had become dependent on campaign contributions from those with cases
before the court. After the election, legal academics and public interest
organizations began discussing changes to Ohio’s semi-partisan system.4
Legal scholarship focused on the appearance of corruption and loss of
judicial independence, and public interest organizations began
discussing merit selection and campaign finance reform.5
Ohio’s semi-partisan method is unique in that it elects state
Supreme Court justices within both partisan and non-partisan electoral
contexts.6 Candidates campaign during primaries openly displaying
their partisanship, but during the general election candidates’
partisanship is removed and candidates cannot announce their party
affiliation. Mixing both partisan and nonpartisan contexts represents an
3. Stephen Dyer, et al., Dirty Ads Tarnish Judicial Campaigns, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 25,
2002, at A1. See also Kara Baker, Comment Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio
Judicial Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Supreme Court,
35 AKRON L. REV. 159, 160-66 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 177-81; David Barnhizer, On the Make: Campaign
Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 406, 422-23
(2001); Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic Accountability of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 485-87 (2002); Jonathan Entin, Judicial
Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 523, 557 (2002); Roy A. Schotland, Financing
Judicial Elections, 2002: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U. - D.C.L. 849, 869-76
(2001) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2001]; Roy A. Schotland, Comment on Professor Carrington’s
Article, ‘The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio,’ 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 489 (2002) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2002]; Roy A. Schotland, Symposium: Selection of
State Appellate Judges: Political Party Affiliation in Partisan and Nonpartisan Judicial Elections:
To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
1397, 1398 (2003) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2003]; Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of
Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV 559, 562 (2002).
5. See supra note 4 (providing examples of such legal scholarship). Public interest
organizations interested in reforming Ohio’s judicial selection processes and campaign finance
include: The American Judicature Society at http://www.ajs.org/selection/index.asp; The Brennan
Center for Law and Policy at http://www. brennancenter.org; The Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied
Politics, University of Akron at http://www.uakron.edu/bliss; Justice at Stake Campaign at
http://www.faircourts.org; Judicial Impartiality: The Next Steps at http://www.thenextsteps.org;
Ohio League of Woman Voters at http://www.lwvohio.org/map.htm; Ohio Citizen Action at
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/moneypolitics/mp.html; Ohio State Bar Association at http://www.
ohiobar.org; The John Glenn Institute for Public Service & Public Policy, Ohio State University at
http://www.gleeninstitute.org. These organizations provide information concerning Ohio’s history
of judicial selection reform and offer policy alternatives to the semi-partisan system. The websites
have links to policy papers, money and politics databases, and other campaign finance and state
court election reform efforts.
6. Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES (Univ. Press of
America 1993). See also Philip L. Dubois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH (Univ. of Austin Press 1980);
Henry R. Glick, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE (McGraw-Hill 1998); Sheldon & Maule, supra
note 1.
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attempt to remove partisanship and corruption.7 Additionally, the semipartisan system theoretically serves to balance the demands of popular
democracy against the court’s independence.8
However, recent legal scholarship has argued that the semi-partisan
system no longer ensures this balance.9 Scholars are concerned the court
can no longer remain objective, arguing judicial elections have become
similar to legislative campaigns.10 Elections require judicial candidates
to engage in fundraising, seek voter approval and address political issues
before the court. Scholars argue elections place inappropriate demands
on the court by having candidates seek campaign contributions from
individuals and interest groups that may later expect the court to rule
based on prior campaign contributions.11 In short, many of these
scholars argue the semi-partisan method has failed to isolate the court
from the demands of popular elections.12 Reforming the semi-partisan
method is viewed as a necessary step to ensure the court’s independence
and impartiality.13
7. Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections: Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan Results,
32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 767-68 (1971). See also Laurence Baum & Mark Kemper, The Ohio
Judiciary, in OHIO POLITICS 283-302 (Alexander Lamis, ed., Kent State Univ. Press 1994);
CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 62
(Praeger 1999); Kathleen L. Barber, Judicial Politics in Ohio, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN
OHIO 90-92 (Carl Leiberman, ed., Univ. Press of America 1984); ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA
ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 126-127 (Yale Univ. Press 1988).
8. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 5-8 (American Judicature Society 1990).
9. See Baker, supra note 3, at 168-75; Solimine, supra note 4, at 560-61, 571-73.
10. See Research and Policy Comm., Center for Economic Development, JUSTICE FOR HIRE:
IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION, 11-12 (2002), available at http://www.ced.org/
docs/report/report_ judicial.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR HIRE]. See also Doug Oplinger, Supreme
Court Races Less Dirty, Still Feisty, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 11, 2004, at A1.
11. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364-66; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 851, 857.
12. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364-66; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 851, 857.
13. See Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 471, 482. The terms ‘independence’ and
‘impartiality’ are used with imprecision. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the vague
nature of these terms within Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). According
to Alexander Hamilton, “[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed. 1961). Here Hamilton used the term within a separation of powers context. Id. But Hamilton
later used the term within a different context. When he argued: “[i]f, then, the courts of justice are
to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachment, this
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges. . . .” Id. at 469.
Hamilton also commented on judicial impartiality, attempting to persuade New York that
life tenure on the court provides impartiality:
To avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they [judges] should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case that comes before them . . . [t]he records of those precedents
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must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk and must demand long and laborious
study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. . . . [A] temporary duration in office
will naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to
accept a seat on the bench . . . .
Id. at 471.
Reading the passage, contradictory interpretations of judicial impartiality emerge. Hamilton
attempts to persuade that both judges and the court are impartial. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471.
The United States Supreme Court recently argued that the term ‘judicial impartiality’ is overly
broad and uncertain. See White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-780 (2002). Justice Scalia argued the term was
ambiguous as a justification for limiting speech, stating that the various meanings of impartiality
include: (1) the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding; (2) lack of preconception in
favor of or against a particular view; or (3) open-mindedness. Id. at 775, 777-78. This laborious
passage concerning the terms “judicial independence and impartiality” is intended to demonstrate
the misuse of the terms and why the terms obfuscate the judicial selection debate.
See also Bradley Link, Note, Had Enough in Ohio? Time to Reform Ohio’s Judicial
Selection Process, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (2004). Link argues that “[o]ur legal system rests on
the fundamental idea that judges will serve as independent and un-biased arbiters of the law.
Unfortunately, the current model for selecting judges in Ohio through non-partisan elections falls
far short of the mark. . . .” Id. at 124. Link also argues the semi-partisan system has several
“pitfalls”. According to Link:
Our system of electing judges has several negative effects: (1) election of judges gives
the appearance that the judiciary will be unable to act with the independence and
impartiality necessary for the proper; (2) election of judges undermines the public
confidence in the judiciary; and (3) election of judges may discourage qualified
candidates from seeking the bench.
Id. at 126. Link concluded that “Ohio needs to make the radical change to an appointive method of
selecting judges. . .to shore up public confidence in the judiciary and ensure the integrity and
impartiality of the courts.” Id. at 152.
See also Jeffery W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of
the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003). Stempel’s article does not critique semi-partisan elections
specifically. However, the article argues against judicial elections and calls for judicial selection
reform. According to Stempel:
When the judiciary is chosen through rough-and-tumble elections, we have hyperdemocracy that has become cancerous and perhaps metastasized so as to infect the
judiciary adversely in ways beyond the selection process itself. Although my metaphor
is perhaps hyperbolic, is it instructive and, in my view correct. With so much
electioneering over so many offices which voters know so little, we have created a status
quo that consumes public resources wastefully (e.g. more money spent on election
administration and verification; more money spent on media, much of it merely negative
rather than informative) for relatively little improvement in civic virtue.
Id. at 50.
See also David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial
Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003). Goldberger
argues that “[t]he widespread use of judicial elections to select state court judges continues to create
a serious tension between our respect for elections as preferred mechanism to select our state court
judges and our desire to have judges who are sufficiently removed from politics to be fair and
impartial decisionmakers.” Id. at 1.
See also Lawrence Baum, Perspectives on Judicial Independence: Judicial Elections and
Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2003). Baum’s research
addresses voter perception of judicial independence. He argues state court elections have remained
relatively low information level campaigns, stating that, “[l]acking much information, voters
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Numerous publications and policy discussions have focused on the
perceived failures of Ohio’s semi-partisan system and campaign finance
law.14 For example, Ohio State University’s John Glenn Institute for
Public Service and Public Policy, while not arguing explicitly that
interest group contributions undermine the court, does support judicial
selection reform due to fears that interest group issue-advocacy
campaigns threaten judicial independence and impartiality.15
In
addition, The Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Stake Campaign,
Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, Ohio League of Women Voters, Ohio
State Bar Association and Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer assembled
a judicial conference, “Judicial Impartiality: The Next Steps,” addressing
frequently decline to choose between judicial candidates. When they do make a choice, they base
that choice on the scraps of information they do hold, primarily information they glean from the
ballot.” Id. at 38. Baum also suggests that state supreme court races have departed somewhat from
the low-information model with the rise of issue campaigns in supreme court elections:
The proportion of judicial contests that depart from the low-information model surely
has increased over the last two decades. . . it has been concentrated at the state supreme
court level. . . . Has judicial independence declined? For state supreme court justices,
almost certainly it has. Justices are now more likely to face strong opposition campaigns
that are based in large part on their judicial votes and opinions. . . .
Id. at 39. Baum concludes by arguing that the perception that judicial independence is threatened is
an exaggeration: “the effect of this trend on judges’ perceptions of their independence undoubtedly
is substantial. Large-scale campaigns against incumbent judges that achieve success or come close
to it are vivid events. Like other vivid events, they are likely to be exaggerated by observers. . . .”
Id. at 39.
14. According to the ABA Justice in Jeopardy report, elections are creating a contributions
“arms race.” American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar
Association Commission on the Twenty-First Century Judiciary 79 (2003) available at
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/library/n/judiciary_and_the_courts/4543.pdf
[hereinafter
ABA
REPORT]. According to the report, justices become dependent on campaign contributions from
those who contribute—thereby destroying the courts’ independence and impartiality. Id. at 15-16.
The report argues judicial candidates solicit contributions from individuals and interest groups who
have issues before the court creating the appearance of impropriety. Id. at Appendix A, p. 24. The
nonprofit Center for Economic Development (CED) argues justices sell their decisions, depicting
“Justice for Hire” and picturing dollar signs above the court. JUSTICE FOR HIRE, supra note 10. The
report argues, “. . . elections are an inappropriate and detrimental method of selecting judges.” Id. at
4. The CED report concludes rising campaign costs are making justices dependent on interest group
contributions. Id. at 6.
15. See Deborah Merritt, Judicial Campaign Reform Deserves Public Support, The John
Glenn Institute for Public Service and Public Policy, Press Release, January, 13 (2004), available at
http://www.thenextsteps.org/judicial_reform.pdf. Merritt, an Ohio State law professor, wrote the
press release for the Institute stating the Institute’s concerns with interest group issue advocacy and
judicial selection reform. According to Merritt:
Recent judicial elections are not what the framers of the [Ohio] 1851 constitution had in
mind. In the 2000 Supreme Court race, a secretly funded ‘issue-advocacy’ organization
ran unfair ads . . . and alleg[ed] . . . judicial votes were for sale. . . . Public confidence in
the judiciary has fallen[,] . . . voters believe judges are tied to campaign contributors, and
qualified candidates don’t want to subject themselves to malicious attacks.
Id. at 1.
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options for regulating campaign contributions and judicial elections.16
Recently, national attention addressing state judicial selection and
campaign finance reform has criticized elections as a means of ensuring
judicial independence.17 The American Bar Association (ABA) Justice
in Jeopardy report criticizes elections as a means of judicial selection,
arguing elections produce highly politicized political environments that
are contrary to the nature of judicial office.18 The ABA argues that
courts are unique within the separate branches of government and that
courts are assumed non-political institutions.19 It supports replacing
elections with a commission-based appointive method that removes the
court from the political process.20 Ohio lawmakers have noted the ABA
proposals and have begun drafting legislation that will alter Ohio’s semipartisan system.21
Much of the debate concerning judicial selection reform rests on
assumptions about money.22 But little is known about the precise way
16. See Judicial Independence and Impartiality: The Next Steps, A Progress Report (2004),
available at http://www.thenextsteps.org/NextStepsProgressReport.pdf (addressing policy options
for regulating campaign contributions and judicial selection reform). The report calls for several
judicial selection and campaign finance related reforms, including extended supreme court terms,
changing judicial qualifications, judicial compensation, campaign finance disclosure and voter
education guides. Id. at 3-6.
17. GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 2, at 5.
18. ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 24.
19. ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-19.
20. The ABA has long advocated merit selection methods. See ABA REPORT, supra note 14,
at v. The most recent ABA recommendation suggests gubernatorial appointment. Id. The ABA
argues gubernatorial appointment will bring the most qualified gubernatorial candidates to the
bench and improve the quality of courts. Id. at 52. Empirical studies demonstrate judicial selection
methods do not determine the quality of judicial candidates or quality of decisions produced by
courts. According to Melinda Gann Hall:
Empirical research on the effects of judicial selection processes has been quite consistent
in finding that methods of judicial recruitment do not affect either the quality of the
bench or judicial outcomes. Earlier studies, as well as more recent work, all determine
that background characteristics of judges are similar regardless of method of judicial
selection. Likewise, studies demonstrate selection methods do not affect the tendency
for state supreme courts to rule in favor of particular categories of litigants. Based on the
evidence to date, the conclusion reasonably could be drawn that selection mechanisms
simply do not have much of an impact on the operation of state judiciaries.
Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427,
428 (1992).
21. Following the 2000 election, several bills were introduced to change issue advocacy
campaigns, including The Taft-Blackwell Campaign Finance Reform Bill (S.B. 10, 2003) and
“Electioneering Communications,” S.B. 214 and Sub. S.B. 214 (2003-2004).
22. Ohio’s judicial selection debate concerns two competing selection theories. The public
good theory argues elections do not ensure democratic accountability. See DAVID W. ADAMANY &
GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1975); OWEN
M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (Harvard Univ. Press 1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-
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Ohio Supreme Court elections are financed. While numerous studies
address the semi-partisan system as an electoral method, few studies
address campaign finance specifically.23 To date there has been little
academic research on judicial campaign finance in Ohio. The current
research examines many assumptions underlying Ohio’s method of
judicial selection and related campaign finance system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Explaining Semi-Partisan Electoral Outcomes
The semi-partisan method employed in Ohio is known for
producing partisan campaigning.24 Electoral outcomes can be explained
as partisan contests conducted through the activities of candidates,
political parties and interest groups.
Political science literature
recognizes political parties, interest groups, incumbency, candidate
Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994);
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance
Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1627 (1999); Bert Neuborne, Is Money
Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV.1609 (1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1126 (1994). This view contends elections undermine democratic accountability by
bringing money into the political process; money undermines democratic equality; unequal policy
reflects the views of elites. The constitutional rights view argues elections provide democratic
accountability by promoting speech within the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mitch McConnell, In
Defense of Soft Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at A 17; Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L. J. 45 (1997); Bradley A. Smith, Soft
Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179-200
(1998); Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1999); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). This view argues campaign finance
reform limits speech by limiting contributions; regulating money regulates political expression. The
Ohio reform debate adheres to public good theory: critics argue semi-partisan elections create
expensive general election campaigns, increase interest group activity and threaten judicial
independence and impartiality.
23. DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 242-43. See also Phillip L. DuBois, Penny for Your Thoughts?
Campaign Spending in Trail Court Elections, 1976-1982, 39 W. POL. Q. 265, 266 (1986); Mary L.
Volcansek, An Exploration of the Judicial Election Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572, 577 (1981); Susan
Welch & Timothy Bledsoe, The Partisan Consequences of Nonpartisan Elections and the Changing
Nature of Urban Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128, 128 (1986).
24. See Barber, supra note 7, at 774, 783-84; BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 288; Welch
& Bledsoe, supra note 23; Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Politics: Rules, Structures, and the
Political Game, AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 114-139 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace,
eds.) (Chatham House Publishers 1999).
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quality and money as explanatory variables affecting electoral
outcomes.25 These will all be examined here.
B. Political Parties
Political parties affect electoral outcomes by influencing the
amount of information voters have about the candidates. Political
parties educate voters about judicial candidates’ partisanship through
voter slate cards and related campaign brochures.26 Party campaign
literature increases partisan awareness and information levels about
judicial candidates by making party identification an information cue
that helps voters choose within the semi-partisan method.27
Political parties also influence electoral outcomes through
campaign contributions and related campaign expenditures.28 Political
parties provide campaign contributions to judicial candidates and are
noted for campaign expenditures through television media, get-out-thevote activities and direct mail.29 Previous scholarship is limited
concerning how political parties contribute to judicial candidates within
different electoral contexts.30
C. Interest Groups
In recent years, issue concerns such as education and tort reform
have brought interest groups into judicial elections.31 However, interest
25. See Laurence Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 420 (1983) [hereinafter BAUM 1983]; Lawrence Baum, Explaining
the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 W. POL. Q., 361, 367
(1987) [hereinafter BAUM 1987].
26. See, e.g., JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (4th ed.
Wadsworth 2000); DANIEL M. SHEA & MICHAEL JOHN BURTON, CAMPAIGN CRAFT: THE
STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND ART OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT (Praeger 2001); FRANK J.
SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE (Yale Univ. Press 1992).
27. See, e.g., Marie Hojanacki & Lawrence Baum, “New Style” Judicial Campaigns and the
Voters: Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 W. POL. Q. 921, 944 (1992); Peverill
Squire & Eric R.A.N. Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections,
50 J. POL. 169, 171 (1988). See also BAUM 1983, supra note 25, at 427-29; BAUM 1987, supra note
25, at 365, 368.
28. See MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND
ELECTIONS IN AMERICAN STATES (CQ Press 2001). See also MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L.
GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN
STATES (The Rockefeller Institute Press 1998); Shea & Burton, supra note 26.
29. See DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 40; MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28.
30. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28, at 105-109.
31. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context,
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997). See also Hojanacki & Baum,
supra note 27, at 921. According to Baum, “[e]lectoral campaigns for judgeships. . .typically have
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groups have a more lengthy history of campaigning on behalf of judicial
Interest groups support candidates that share an
candidates.32
organization’s partisan and ideological perspectives: Republican interest
groups generally represent business, agriculture and medicine;
Democratic interest groups generally represent labor, education and
public interest advocacy.33 Interest groups affect electoral outcomes by
endorsing judicial candidates and participating in direct mail and
television media campaigns. Political science literature demonstrates
that interest group campaigning increases voter information levels much
like the effects of political parties; the partisan information voters learn
through interest group literature increases voters’ partisan awareness of
judicial candidates.34
Interest groups also affect electoral outcomes by contributing
campaign funds to judicial candidates.35 Interest groups actively raise
and contribute campaign funds within the semi-partisan system.36
Critics argue interest group contributions threaten the court’s
impartiality and claim candidates’ campaigns are funded
disproportionately through interest group contributions.37 Empirical
been small in scale, low-key, and devoid of issue content. Over the past decade, however, an
increasing number of campaigns have diverged from this traditional pattern. . . .” Id. He added that
“judicial elections feature substantial campaigns and significant attention from the mass media.
Further, candidates and other participants are increasingly willing to inject policy issues into
campaigns. This new development is what we have come to call ‘new-style’ judicial contests.” Id.
at 922 (internal citations omitted).
32. See JUSTICE FOR HIRE, supra note 10, at 17-20; ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 18.
33. See JEFFERY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 136-137 (2d ed. 1997). See also
BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 292.
34. See BERRY, supra note 33, at 105-110; Brace & Hall, supra note 31, at 1213-16; JOHN R.
WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 90-91
(Allyn and Bacon 1996).
35. MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28, at 77-103.
36. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 299.
37. SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 880. Judicial scholar Roy A. Schotland is particularly
critical of Ohio elections. Schotland contends receiving contributions from interest groups that have
interests before the court, undermines the courts impartiality. See id. Schotland reasons elections
make justices dependent on campaign contributions: contributions mean justices have to appeal to
those giving the contributions; the process weakens impartiality. Id. According to Schotland, “[t]he
judge’s obligation is completely at odds with seeking the support of organized groups that have
clear goals for what they want government to do or refrain from doing.” Id. at 860.
Other scholars have made more aggressive claims concerning campaign contributions.
Cleveland-Marshall law professor David Barnhizer argues the corruption of courts is deliberate,
stating that “[t]he corruption of the judiciary includes deliberate judicial wrongdoing in exchange
for financial contributions. . . . [It] involves subtle judicial behavior shaped to fit contributors’
agendas. . . . [E]ven if judicial corruption through decisions that favor special interest is not
empirically demonstrable. . . .” Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 366. Barnhizer adds that, “[o]ne
consequence of the rising cost of judicial elections and the amassing of large pools of campaign
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research is limited concerning how interest groups contribute to judicial
candidates within different electoral contexts.38
D. Incumbency
Perhaps the most notable characteristic within the semi-partisan
system is the effect of incumbency.
Political science research
consistently finds incumbency produces an electoral advantage.39
Incumbents rarely lose under the semi-partisan system even when faced
with competitive challenger campaigns.40 This is because incumbency
often provides voters with partisan information cues based on previous
vote choice.41
Previous scholarship has also noted that incumbents consistently
outspend challengers.42 Because incumbents rarely lose and have
established a judicial record, incumbents easily attract campaign
contributions.43 Critics argue incumbents excessively campaign to raise
funds by special interests is that many judicial candidates are consciously and unconsciously selling
their votes on issues . . . [, and] candidates are willing to provide what the donors want in exchange
for their money.” Id. at 364.
Professor Paul Carrington argues contributions and the role of interest group campaigning
undermines the Court’s independence and accountability. Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 47273. According to Carrington:
The Supreme Court of Ohio . . . is in a crisis resulting from an unseemly flood of money
into statewide judicial election campaigns . . . . The expensiveness of media campaigns
has the dramatic effect of forcing not only judicial candidates but sitting judges hoping
for re-election to seek and accumulate large campaign war chests. Often lawyers and
litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large proportions of the
contributions. . . .
Id. at 455, 474. Carrington later commented that, “[a]t best, campaign fundraising by judicial
candidates is unseemly and degrading. At worst, it tempts those with an interest in a state’s law to
try to buy a high court.” Id. at 474.
38. See e.g. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 303-330 (demonstrating the lack of empirical
data on interest group influence on judicial campaigns by way of an entire chapter devoted to
lobbying and interests that does not refer to the judiciary once).
39. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 7, at 768; BAUM 1983, supra note 25, at 422-23; BAUM &
KEMPER, supra note 7, at 288; CARL LIEBERMAN, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN OHIO (Univ.
Press of America 1984).
40. BAUM 1983, supra note 25. See also BAUM 1987, supra note 25.
41. See BAUM 1983, supra note 25; BAUM 1987, supra note 25; Hojanacki & Baum, supra
note 27.
42. See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 105-110 (Yale Univ.
Press 1980) [hereinafter JACOBSON 1980]; Gary Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in
House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334 [hereinafter EFFECTS
OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING]; Robert K. Goidel & Donald A. Gross, Reconsidering the ‘Myths and
Realities’ of Campaign Finance Reform, 21 LEG. STUDIES Q. 129 (1996); Donald Philip Green &
Jonathon S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign
Spending In House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884 (1988).
43. See JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 113 (noting the incumbent advantage as manifested
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campaign funds under the semi-partisan system and argue incumbents
are dependent on interest group contributions.44 Literature is limited
concerning how the semi-partisan method affects incumbents’
fundraising demands.
E. Candidate Quality
Political science research demonstrates that candidate quality
affects electoral outcomes by increasing electoral competition.45 The
semi-partisan method generally produces quality candidates for the
court.46 Candidate quality is often a measure of previous experience and
accomplishment; moreover, quality candidates attract media attention
and interest group endorsements.47
Candidate quality is also recognized to affect interest group and
political party behavior. Challengers demonstrating an ability to raise
campaign contributions generally attract interest group and political
party contributions.48
Critics argue the semi-partisan method
discourages quality challengers, claiming the most qualified candidates
do not run because of the demands of fundraising.49 Political science
literature has found that candidate quality affects challengers’ ability to
raise campaign funds.50 Yet, previous literature is limited concerning
how candidate quality affects electoral competitiveness within the semipartisan system.
F. Money
Political science literature consistently finds that money does not
win elections.51 However, the perception persists despite decades of
campaign finance research. Political science scholarship demonstrates
that when money is used as an explanatory variable, the relationship is
relatively weak in explaining electoral outcomes.52 Instead, other
in Congressional elections).
44. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 378, 392; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 890-93.
45. See JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 106; Green & Krasno, supra note 42, at 891, 898.
46. See BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 285; LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 90.
47. See BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 285-87.
48. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 287. See also DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 6-8.
49. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 4, at 568-69.
50. See, e.g., DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 6-19; JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 106.
51. See, e.g., ANTHONY CORRADO, ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK
(Brookings Institution Press 1997); ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (The
Century Foundation Press 2000); ANTHONY CORRADO, ET AL., INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
BATTLE (Brookings Institution Press 2003).
52. See generally, Jacobson, supra note 42, at 105-6; Green & Krasno, supra note 42, at 884-
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explanatory variables such as incumbency and party affiliation are more
predictive within the semi-partisan system.53
Yet there is no other explanatory variable that is so widely
discussed and so inadequately explained within judicial selection reform
as money.54 Critics are concerned that judicial campaign costs are
increasing judicial candidates’ reliance on interest group contributions.55
Previous research is limited concerning campaign contributions to
judicial candidates from individuals, interest groups and political parties
and how campaign expenditures affect semi-partisan electoral outcomes.
G. Current Study
The current study examines Ohio’s semi-partisan judicial electoral
system by evaluating contributions and expenditures data. The research
describes and explains the effects of money and how judicial campaign
finance operates within the semi-partisan system during the 1992–2002
Ohio Supreme Court elections.56 It examines incumbent and challenger
contribution patterns; contributions from individuals, interest groups and
political parties; and candidates’ expenditures within incumbent,
challenger and open seat electoral contexts. The study also evaluates the
effects of candidate quality, interest group endorsements, and bar ratings
within the semi-partisan system during the 1982 – 2002 elections.57
5; and Goidel & Gross, supra note 42, at 142-5. The campaign finance literature finds that, once
candidates reach a competitive spending threshold, money becomes less predictive in explaining
electoral outcomes. See Jacobson, supra note 42, at 105. This idea is fundamental to understanding
the campaign finance literature. When candidates are competitive, other campaign-related factors
(e.g. incumbency, candidate quality) become more predictive. But, as Jacobson argues, independent
variables such as candidate quality and incumbency often become “mutually reinforcing variables.”
See Jacobson, supra note 43, at 106.
53. See Robert S. Erikson & Thomas Palfrey, Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An
Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach, 60 J. POL. 355 (1998); JACOBSON 1980, supra note
42, at 136-62; EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING, supra note 42, at 357; Green & Krasno, supra
note 42, at 884-85.
54. See Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 474; MCFADDEN, supra note 8, at 25-27;
SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4; SCHOTLAND 2002, supra note 4; SCHOTLAND 2003, supra note 4.
55. See ABA Report, supra note 14, at 22-25.
56. The contributions and expenditures data represents elections for Associate Justice and
does not include data for Chief Justice.
57. The research incorporates two different data sets: (1) campaign contributions and
expenditures data obtained through the Ohio Secretary of State (1992-2002); and (2) interest group
endorsement data from the labor union AFSCME and candidate quality data from the Ohio State
Bar Association ratings (1982-2002). The campaign contribution and expenditure data is not
complete from the Ohio Secretary of State and therefore earlier data could not be obtained in
electronic data form. Using the AFSCME and Ohio Bar Association ratings were readily available
and used as a preliminary analysis of the effects of interest group endorsements and bar ratings as
explanatory variables. The current research uses descriptive statistics which limits the predictive
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The current research addresses campaign finance questions
commonly affirmed within judicial selection literature. The most
persistent questions concern the effects of semi-partisan elections on
judicial candidates, the effects of contributions from individuals, interest
groups and political parties and the effects of judicial candidates’
campaign expenditures. The study uses descriptive statistics to evaluate
current assumptions underlying the judicial selection debate.58
H. Data Collection
The contribution and expenditure data used within the current
research were collected using public records filed with the Ohio
Secretary of State. The contribution and expenditure data represent
twelve Ohio Supreme Court races during the period of 1992-2002 within
incumbent, challenger and open seat electoral contexts. General election
vote totals were also obtained through the Ohio Secretary of State’s
election archive.
Currently, independent expenditures by interest groups and parties
are not reported to the Secretary of State’s office. The use of
independent expenditures in the 2000 campaign heightened concern over
judicial independence and reinforced public perceptions that campaign
contributions from interest groups unduly influences the court.59
Unfortunately, independent expenditures cannot be analyzed here due to
the lack of available data.
Candidate quality data were provided by the Ohio Bar Association,
which rated judicial candidates using scaled measures of judicial
qualifications from highly qualified to unqualified. Interest group
endorsements were collected through the American Federation of State,
qualities of the data. Future studies may incorporate interest group endorsements and bar ratings
into regression models.
58. This research uses an inductive research design and descriptive statistics. The purpose of
descriptive statistics is to formulate generalizations by describing and explaining political events.
Descriptive statistics will help clarify the judicial selection debate by demonstrating how
contributions and expenditures operate within Ohio Supreme Court elections. According to Sidney
Verba, et. al:
Description and explanation both depend upon rules of scientific inference. . . . There
are several fundamental aspects of scientific description. One is that it involves
inference: part of the descriptive task is to infer information about unobserved facts from
the facts we have observed. Another aspect involves distinguishing between that which
is systematic about the observed facts and that which is nonsystematic.
Gary King, et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 34
(Princeton Univ. Press 1994).
59. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364; Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 479;
SCHOTLAND 2003, supra note 4, at 1423.
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County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). These endorsements are
used to evaluate the effect of interest group support within the semipartisan method. Party affiliation, AFSCME endorsements, ABA
ratings and incumbency data are examined through twenty-six Ohio
Supreme Court elections from 1982-2002.
III. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Incumbents’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions
The semi-partisan method has been criticized as placing excessive
fundraising burdens on judicial candidates.60 The data in Table 1 display
incumbents’ contributions during 1992-2002. The contribution data
represent total yearly contributions. The data reveal that incumbent
justices do not raise contributions during non-election years. Justice
Resnick and Justice Pfeifer are the only exceptions to these findings.
Only Justice Resnick raised significant money in the year prior to the
election.
Table 1: Contributions Raised by Incumbents During Election Terms
RESNICK

DOUGLAS

SWEENEY

PFEIFER

COOK

STRATTON

1992

123

1993

91

1994

732,002

1995

5,914

1996

1,927

441,582

1997

1,667

226

1998

999

1999

245,964

27,713

68,475

2000

238,610

17,664

919,702

2001

9,897

11,891

154

2002

3,903

4,569

1,901,801

50

29,885

536,554

575,847

Note: Incumbent Re-election years are in bold print.
Note: Incumbents were re-elected in every election from 1992-2002.
60. Those concerned with judicial selection often characterize elections as discouraging
judicial candidates from running for office. A common argument is qualified judicial candidates do
not run because of the fundraising demands of running for office. See, e.g., Link, supra note 13, at
131-2; Stempel, supra note 13, at 48-9.
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B. Challengers’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions
Challengers also allocate limited time to raising campaign
contributions. In other words, challengers do not raise money during
non-election years. The data in Table 2 represent total yearly
contributions raised by challengers. The data reveal challengers
contributions are increasing since the 2000 elections. Prior to 2000, the
highest contributions raised were $276,196; since 2000, challengers have
raised over $1 million. The data reveal challengers’ campaign
contributions are representative of the ability of challengers to win
within the semi-partisan system.
Table 2: Contributions Raised by Challengers During Election Years
HARPER

SIKORA

POWELL

SUSTER

1998

260322

276196

1999

188

9492

BLACK

ODONNELL

405

7111

694394

1016426

BURNSIDE

1992
1993
1994

249900

1995
1996

34803

1997

325

2000
2001
2002

1193733

C. Open Seat Candidates’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions
Previous scholarship demonstrates that contributions increase
within open seat electoral contexts.61 The data reveal open seat
candidates do not raise campaign contributions during non-election
years. Data in Table 3 represent total campaign contributions within
open seat electoral contexts. Parties, interest groups and other
contributors are perhaps more willing to participate in open seat
elections because the elections are perceived as competitive. The data
61. According to election scholar Daniel Shea, “[o]pen-seat elections tend to offer a more
even footing than those in which the incumbent wins, . . . many open seats are considered toss-ups.”
Shea & Burton, supra note 26, at 31. Jacobson feels that “[e]lections for open seats are typically
much more competitive than those between incumbents and challengers.” JACOBSON 1980, supra
note 42, at 106.
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reveal the semi-partisan system becomes more competitive within open
seat electoral contexts.
Table 3: CONTRIBUTIONS RAISED BY CANDIDATES IN OPEN SEAT ELECTIONS

1992

SWEENEY

PFEIFFER

642,063

572,440

COOK

HAFFEY

518,943

288,920

STRATTON

BETTMAN

BLACK

OCONNOR

1,300,410

1,777,617

1993
1994
1995
1996

483,119

442,256

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

D. Incumbent Contributions: Interest Groups, Individuals and Political
Parties
Despite the common perception that incumbent justices are
disproportionately dependent on interest group contributions, Table 4
and Figure 1 reveal that incumbents are not receiving a greater
percentage of money from interest groups. The data reveal that
incumbents receive 51 percent of campaign contributions from
individuals; interest group contributions represent 44 percent of
campaign contributions; and political parties represent 5 percent of
campaign contributions during the 1992-2002 elections. The negligible
5 percent contributed by political parties is surprisingly low considering
political parties’ aggressive fundraising activities. The low party amount
may represent incumbents’ abilities to raise contributions from
individuals and interest groups.
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Table 4: Re-Election Year Contributions to Incumbents
Total Raised

Groups

Individuals

Party

D

RESNICK

1994

$732,002

31%

52%

17%

R

DOUGLAS

1996

$441,582

40%

60%

0%

D

SWEENEY

1998

$536,554

46%

54%

0%

R

PFEIFER

1998

$575,847

46%

54%

0%

R

COOK

2000

$919,702

58%

33%

8%

D

RESNICK

2000

$484,574

58%

42%

0%

R

STRATTON

2002

$1,901,801

29%

63%

8%

AVERAGE

0.44

0.51

0.05

Figure 1: Incumbent Percent of Total Election Year Dollars
Raised from Political Parties, Interest Groups and Individual
Contributions
Incumbent Percent of Total Election Year Dollars Raised from
Political Parties, Interest Group and Individual Contributions

Political Party
5%
Interest Group
44%
Individual, 51%
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E. Challenger Contributions: Interest Groups, Individuals and Political
Parties
The contribution patterns for challengers and incumbents are
similar. But challengers are more likely to receive contributions from
interest groups and individuals. Political parties, on the other hand, are
the least likely contributors to challengers within the semi-partisan
system. The data in Table 5 represent challenger contributions during
1994-2002 elections. The data reveal interest group contributions
represent 49 percent of challenger campaign contributions, individual
contributions represent 36 percent of challenger campaign contributions
and political party contributions represent 14 percent of challenger
campaign contributions.
Table 5: Election Year Contributions to Challengers
Total Raised

Groups

Individuals

Party

R

HARPER

1994

$24,990

54%

12%

34%

D

SIKORA

1996

$34,803

62%

34%

3%

R

POWELL

1998

$260,322

42%

39%

19%

D

SUSTER

1998

$276,196

49%

51%

0%

D

BLACK

2000

$694,394

53%

47%

0%

R

ODONNELL

2000

$1,016,426

41%

26%

33%

D

BURNSIDE

2002

$1,193,733

43%

43%

14%

AVERAGE

0.49

0.36

0.14
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Figure 2: Challenger Percent of Total Election Year Dollars Raised from
Political Parties, Interest Groups and Individual Contributions

Challenger Percent of Total Election Year Dollars
Raised from Political Parties, Interest Group and
Individual Contributions
Political Parties
14%
Interest Groups
49%
Individuals
36%

F. Campaign Spending: Incumbent Categorized Expenditures
Table 6 displays total expenditures by incumbents and the
percentage of the vote that incumbents received. Every incumbent won
re-election during the 1994-2002 elections. The expenditure data reveal
that campaign costs did not escalate until the 2002 elections,
contradicting the perception that the 2000 campaign increased campaign
costs. Incumbents during 1994-2002 spent an average of $670,000, and
were re-elected with 60 percent of the vote.
Categorized expenditures in Figure 3 reveal the percentages
spent on various campaign services during 1994-2002 elections.
Incumbents allocated 78 percent of their campaign budgets to media
advertising, 13 percent to consultant services and the remaining
expenditures to direct mail and staff. Incumbent expenditure data reveal
that Ohio Supreme Court elections are professionally conducted
campaigns using professional campaign services, meaning that
incumbent justices hire professional fundraising, speech writing, polling
and media services.62
62. Election scholarship has discussed judicial campaigns’ increasing reliance on media and
campaign consultants. Shea argues campaign professionalism has created consultant-centered
campaigns. Shea & Burton, supra note 26, at 12. He feels that consultant-centered campaigns are
distinct by three characteristics: new players (professional consultants replaced party activists); new
incentives (specialized skill within direct mail, strategy, media, fundraising); and new resources
(ability to raise money outside party contributions). Id. According to Shea, “campaigns are now
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Table 6: Incumbent Total Expenditures and Percentage of the Vote
INCUMBENTS

Total Expenditures

%Vote

1994

RESNICK

$543,017

59

1996

DOUGLAS

$366,557

66

1998

SWEENEY

$484,280

62

1998

PFEIFFER

$512,461

71

2000

COOK

$645,542

52

2000

RESNICK

$559,367

57

2002

STRATTON

$1,704,379

55

$687,943

60

AVERAGE

Figure 3: Incumbents Expenditures Categorized
INCUMBENT ELECTION YEAR EXPENDITURES
Headquarters
1%
Consulting 8%
Staff 2%
Direct Mail 5%
Fundraising 5%
Travel 2%

Media 77%

staffed by people who know the strategies, tactics, and art of political management, . . . everything
from fund-raising activities, to direct mail, to television advertising, to grassroots activities is now
coordinated by well paid campaign consulting firms.” Id.
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G. Campaign Spending: Challenger Categorized Expenditures
Challenger expenditure data in Table 7 reveal that challengers’
campaign expenditures are escalating. During the 1994 election,
Democratic challenger Harper spent only $9,845.
Democratic
challengers continued spending small amounts until the 2000 election
where Democratic challenger Black outspent Republican incumbent
Cook ($676,409 - $645,542); Black still lost the election. Challengers
during 1994-2002 spent an average $415,726 and received
approximately 40 percent of the vote. The significance here is that
challenger expenditures are becoming more competitive.63
Categorized expenditure data in Figure 4 reveal the percentages
spent by challengers on campaign services. Challengers allocated 52
percent of their campaign budgets to media advertising, 14 percent to
direct mail, 22 percent to campaign consultants and fundraising, 15
percent to headquarters and staff and the remaining expenditures to
travel expenses.
Challenger expenditure data reveal challenger
campaigns are professionally conducted and increasingly reliant on
professional fundraising, speech writing, polling and media services.

63. According to campaign finance scholar Gary Jacobson, “[t]he most important factor
affecting how much money non-incumbents can raise is their perceived probability of winning.
Sure losers do not attract campaign contributions. . . . [C]andidates must convince the elites who
provide campaign funds that they have a chance to win. . . .” JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at
105-6. Jacobson argues:
Another important variable, one that interacts strongly with the probability of election
(as well as the availability of funds) is quality of the candidate . . . . Good candidates
attract financial support; the availability of money attracts good candidates. The
consequence is a triad of mutually reinforcing variables: quality of candidate, probability
of victory, and availability of campaign funds.
Id. at 106. The current research demonstrates Jacobson’s theory: candidates are becoming more
competitive because the candidates are perceived as winners, which increases contribution and
expenditures levels.
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Table 7: Challenger Total Expenditures and Percentage of the Vote
CHALLENGER

Total Expenditures

% Vote

1994

HARPER

$9,845

41

1996

SIKORA

$30,670

34

1998

POWELL

$158,961

38

1998

SUSTER

$248,306

29

2000

BLACK

$676,409

48

2000

ODONNELL

$619,594

43

2002

BURNSIDE

$1,166,298

45

$415,726

40

AVERAGE

Figure 4: Challenger Expenditures Categorized
CHALLENGER ELECTION-YEAR EXPENDITURES
Headquarters 5%
Consulting 11%
Travel 3%

Staff 3%

Direct Mail 14%
Fundraising 11%

Media 52%
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H. Electoral Context and Candidate Quality
Critics commonly argue election costs are escalating within the
semi-partisan system.64 The data in Table 8 display aggregate electionyear expenditures. The data reveal increased election costs have varied
according to electoral context and candidate quality. Incumbent contexts
with weak challengers produce lower aggregate election-year
expenditures; incumbent contexts with strong challengers produce
higher aggregate election-year expenditures. During the 1994 and 1996
elections, challengers were non-competitive, spending less than 50
percent of the incumbents’ total expenditures. As a result, aggregate
election year expenditures were low. During the 2000 election,
challenger quality improved, with challengers outspending incumbents.
Furthermore, during the 2002 election, challenger competitiveness
increased, as challengers spent 50 percent more than their incumbent
counterparts.
Aggregate election year expenditures also increase within open seat
electoral contexts. During the 1992 election, aggregate election-year
expenditures increased as a result of candidate quality, though spending
more than one’s opponent did not necessarily guarantee victory (e.g.
Patton outspent Pfeifer and lost). During the 2002 election, increased
aggregate election-year expenditures reflected increased candidate
competitiveness. Election costs are escalating, but the costs are a
consequence of increased candidate expenditures and increasingly wellfunded challengers. 65
64. See ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 22.
65. The current research demonstrates that escalating costs vary according to electoral context
and candidate quality. The methodology within the current research relies on descriptive statistics
using aggregate election expenditures within different electoral contexts. The current approach
differs from previous judicial selection literature by explaining the variation and increased levels of
election spending.
The question as to what methodology to employ is important for future research concerning
judicial campaign finance. Caution must be given as to comparing open seat and incumbent
campaign contexts. For example, comparing the costs of campaigning during the 1980s to current
standards is misleading: the dollars are not adjusted for inflation, the dollars are compared across
electoral contexts (i.e. open seats and incumbent contexts), and the dollars do not explain the
increased professionalization of court elections. See Goidel & Gross, supra note 42, at 142-45;
Hojanacki & Baum, supra note 27, at 921. Skim the reform literature and it does not take long to
come across a comparison of money. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the
reform literature). Take for example, Bradley Link’s comment that, “[h]ere in Ohio, the campaign
for the Chief Justice seat increased over $2.5 million dollars from $100 thousand in 1980. . . .”
Link, supra note 13, (referring to an American Bar Association report on ‘Judicial Independence,
Public
Financing
of
Judicial
Campaigns,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/
judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf). See generally Jacobson, supra note 42; Green & Krasno,
supra note 42; and Goidel & Gross, supra note 42 (research providing a summary of campaign
finance measures and methods).
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Table 8: Electoral Context and Candidate Quality
Seat 1

1992

1994

1996

PFEIFER

PATTON

SWEENEY

PAINTER

(O)

(O)

(O)

(O)

$516,476

$650,145

$419,283

$310,976

RESNICK

HARPER

COOK

HAFFEY

(I)

(C)

(O)

(O)

$543,017

$9,845

$264,921

$173,229

DOUGLAS

SIKORA

STRATTON

BETTMAN

(I)

(C)

(O)

(O)

$366,557

1998

2000

2002

Seat 2

$30,670

$103,044

$378,354

SWEENEY

POWELL

PFEIFFER

SUSTER

(I)

(C)

(I)

(C)

$484,280

$158,961

$512,461

$248,306

COOK

BLACK

RESNICK

ODONNELL

(I)

(C)

(I)

(C)

$645,542

$676,409

$559,367

$619,594

STRATTON

BURNSIDE

OCONNOR

BLACK

(I)

(C)

(O)

(O)

$1,704,379

$1,166,298

$1,602,565

$1,306,396

AGGREGATE

$1,896,880

$991,012

$878,625

$1,404,008

$2,500,912

$5,779,638

Critics use aggregate data to compare costs associated with advocacy campaigns. See, e.g.,
GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 2, at 10. Advocacy campaign costs appear to increase when
looking generally at advocacy costs. However, the comparisons do not account for electoral context
and candidate quality. Comparing advocacy campaigns within incumbent and open seat elections
creates a contextual fallacy. Future methods must account for the variation that exists within the
semi-partisan system. Generalizations without attention to election context create misunderstanding
within the judicial selection debate.
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IV. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1982-2002
The current research has used candidate political party affiliation,
interest group endorsements, incumbency, quality and expenditures as
explanatory variables within the semi-partisan elections. The current
research relies on descriptive statistics, but future research might model
electoral outcomes using multivariate analysis. With future research in
mind, this short section provides descriptive statistics addressing
electoral outcomes during the 1982-2002 elections. The list also
provides relevant statistics concerning Ohio’s judicial selection debate.
Political parties: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio Supreme
Court since 1982, the Republican candidates won sixteen times or 62
percent of the time.
Interest group endorsements: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio
Supreme Court since 1982, candidates who received AFSCME
endorsements won fifteen times or 58 percent of the time.
Ohio Bar Association ratings: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio
Supreme Court, candidates that received higher bar association ratings
won eleven times or 79 percent of the time.66
Incumbency: of the nineteen incumbents seeking reelection for the
Ohio Supreme Court since 1982, the incumbent candidate won
seventeen times or 89 percent of the time.
Semi-partisan selection method: of the nineteen incumbents
seeking reelection for the Ohio Supreme Court since 1982, the election
result was closer than 60:40 or 68 percent of the time.
Open seats: of the seven open seats for the Ohio Supreme Court
since 1982, the election result was closer than 60:40 or 86 percent of the
time
V. DISCUSSION
The current study is a descriptive analysis of campaign
contributions and expenditures within Ohio’s semi-partisan system. The
data support previous scholarship concerning incumbency and political

66. According to the Ohio State Bar Association Rating method, judicial candidates are rated
“Highly Qualified,” “Recommended,” and “Qualified, But Not Recommended.” OSBA Announces
Supreme Court Candidate Ratings for the November 2004 General Election, available at
http://www.ohiobar.org/pubs/insideosba/?articleid=222 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). The superior
rating of “Highly Qualified” is awarded to candidates receiving favorable votes from 75 percent of
the commission members; the rating “Recommended” is awarded to candidates receiving at least 60
percent of votes from the commission; and “Qualified, But Not Recommended” is awarded to
candidates who fail to receive 60 percent of votes from commission members. Id.
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party effects: incumbents receive on average 60 percent of the vote,67
and the semi-partisan system favors Republican candidates, who
currently hold a 6:1 advantage on the court.68 The data contradict
campaign finance concerns. The results demonstrate the semi-partisan
method does not place inappropriate fundraising demands on judicial
candidates.69 Both incumbents and challengers allocate limited time
toward fundraising in non-election years.70 Additionally, during an
incumbent’s six-year term, he or she will spend roughly one year raising
campaign contributions.71
These data do not support the current understanding of candidate
campaign finance; the campaign finance system does not discourage
qualified judicial candidates. These results indicate that challengers
often raise competitive campaign contributions, outspend incumbents
and lose elections.72 Additionally, judicial candidates’ contributions are
not disproportionately obtained through interest group donors.73 Both
incumbents and challengers raise the majority of contributions from
individuals and interest groups.74 Both receive the least amount of
campaign contributions from political parties.75
Finally, campaign costs are increasing, but as a consequence of
challenger competitiveness. During the 1994-2002 elections, the
average incumbent campaign cost $687,943;76 challengers’ campaigns
cost an averaged $415,726.77 Recent campaigns have cost $1.5
million.78 Nonetheless, the semi-partisan method continues to produce
competitive elections despite the successes of incumbent candidates.79

67. See supra Table 6 and Figure 2.
68. See supra Table 4.
69. See supra Table 4 and Figure 1; Table 5 and Figure 2.
70. See supra Table 1 and Table 3.
71. See supra Table 4.
72. See supra Table 6 and Table 7.
73. See supra Table 4 and Figure 1; Table 5 and Figure 2.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra Table 4 (noting that incumbents receive 95 percent of their contributions from
individuals and interest groups, while challengers receive 85 percent of their contributions from
individuals and interest groups).
77. See supra Table 5 (illustrating that incumbents receive 5 percent of their contributions
from political parties, where challengers receive 14 percent from political parties).
78. See supra Tables 4-7 (showing the expenditures for candidates for judicial office in the
elections held since 2000).
79. See supra Table 6 and Table 7 (noting the percentages each candidate, whether an
incumbent, challenger, or a candidate vying for an open seat, has garnered).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current research demonstrates the variation that exists within
the semi-partisan system. During the 1992-2002 elections, wide
variations existed between incumbents’ and challengers’ contributions
and expenditure patterns.
There are clear differences between
Democrats and Republicans within the semi-partisan system:
Republicans win under the Ohio semi-partisan system regardless of
campaign spending. This finding supports previous semi-partisan
scholarship. However, the data confirm that semi-partisan elections are
predictive. When explanatory variables are combined (particularly
incumbency and partisanship), electoral outcomes make sense. While
the reform effort is quickly proceeding within Ohio,80 the empirical data
necessary to support the changes has not kept pace. The current research
suggests approaching reform with data to support common assumptions
concerning judicial campaign finance and judicial selection.
Critics have offered numerous proposals that alter semi-partisan
elections, but they may overstate the case for reform. Those examining
the data cannot claim that semi-partisan elections are not threatened by
interest group money or that money undermines the judiciary. However,
the data do describe and explain how money operates within the semipartisan system. Additionally, the data do not support the ABA’s
characterization of judicial elections. 81 The semi-partisan system
produces highly qualified candidates and increasingly competitive
elections. Finally, the ABA makes assertions about independent
expenditures and issue advocacy. These questions are beyond the data,
but there are reasons to question their effects. The precise effects of
independent expenditures and issue advocacy have not been explained
because data are lacking.

80. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that Ohio is currently entertaining a bill
to change the judicial selection process).
81. What is now occurring in Ohio is similar to the debate after Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). Philosophic differences emerged within the post-Buckley research. One side viewed
campaign finance reform as a public good: this side argues for regulating speech within the First
Amendment; contribution limits are seen as advancing an important governmental interest in
preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption. See generally
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee,
459 U.S. 197 (1982). The other side views campaign finance reform as threatening speech rights
within the First Amendment; regulations limit political speech and hinder the democratic process;
regulating speech is seen to violate core political speech: “[T]he very purpose of the First
Amendment is to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.” See McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
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Those interested in campaign finance and judicial selection,
regardless of their perspectives, will be challenged by recent changes in
constitutional law. Ohio’s semi-partisan system will be affected by the
recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.82 The ruling in
White alters semi-partisan elections by removing ethical canons that
restrict candidates’ campaign behavior; as a result, semi-partisan
elections may become more politicized under the ruling.83 McConnell
82. See White, 536 U.S. 765; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. The U.S. Supreme Court held in
Republican Party of Minn. v. White that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon on judicial conduct
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing disputed legal or political issues violated the First
Amendment. White, 536 U.S. at 788. The Minnesota Supreme Court canon, the “announce clause,”
unconstitutionally prescribed the context of judicial candidates speech during the course of the
election. Id. The clause prohibited (1) judicial candidates from announcing views on “nonfanciful
legal questions,” and (2) prohibited speech based on its content (e.g. speech about judicial
qualifications). Id. The Court applied the strict scrutiny test, which requires respondents to prove
the clause is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. According to Justice Scalia, “the
notion that the special context of electioneering justifies an abridgment of the right to speak out on
disputed issues set our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head. We have never allowed the
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an
election.” Id. at 781.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission that the
Congressional Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) regulating soft money and issue
advocacy was constitutional under the First Amendment. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224. The Court
held the provisions advanced the important governmental interest in preventing both actual
corruption and the appearance of corruption. Id. at 154. The Court applied the strict scrutiny test
and argued the BCRA was narrowly tailored and served a compelling governmental interest in
bringing soft money contributions and issue advocacy campaigns under the province of Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) 1971. Id. at 114-224.
83. The implications of White and the 2004 Ohio Supreme Court election are as follows:
during the election, Cuyahoga County GOP Chairman James Trakas filed grievance charges with
the Ohio Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Counsel, arguing Democratic candidate Judge William
O’Neill’s campaign literature violated three provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon 7(B)(3)(b) which provides that “after the day of the primary election, a judicial candidate
shall not identify himself or herself in advertising as a member of or affiliated with a political
party.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, No. 1:04CV1612 at 1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2004) available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Judicial_Candidates/fed_lit_canon7/Aldrich_Decision_091404.pdf.
See also OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 7(B)(3)(b) (2004) available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/conduct. Canon 7(D)(2), which states that judicial campaign
materials and ads may not “use the term ‘judge’ when a judge is a candidate for another judicial
office and does not indicate the court on which the judge currently serves.” Id. at § 7(D)(2). Canon
7(B)(1) requires that “judges and judicial candidates shall maintain the dignity appropriate to
judicial office.” Id. at § 7(B)(1). Judge O’Neill’s campaign literature identified his political party
affiliation as Democrat, referenced his judicial experience as a judge for the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh District, and referenced his campaign theme “Money and Judges Don’t Mix.” O’Neill,
No. 1:04CV1612 at 2. Judge O’Neill argued the canons violated judicial candidate’s First
Amendment speech and expression rights under White. Id. at 8-12. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio provided preliminary injunctive relief allowing O’Neill’s
campaign literature to proceed without sanction. Id. at 23-24. The District Court argued the canons
facially violate constitutional speech and expression clauses under White. Id. at 12, 23.
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allows legislatures to regulate campaign conduct by regulating the
timing of campaign ads prior to elections and allows legislatures to write
disclosure laws regulating independent expenditures and issue
advocacy.84 These cases provide the legal and analytical framework for
future challenges to the semi-partisan system.
Elections, although imperfect, provide a means of democratic
accountability; policy change and representation; and reflect evolving
issue concerns. The semi-partisan method occupies a unique place
within Ohio’s political culture and is representative of Ohio’s
competitive politics. Future reforms should recognize Ohio’s political
culture and competitiveness, strengthen semi-partisan elections and
secure judicial choice.

84. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 219-23.
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